Abstract. We design, …eld and exploit novel survey data, from a representative sample of the French population in December 2014 and May 2015, that provide insights regarding two channels via which social interactions may generally a¤ect …nancial decisions. The …rst is a pure information e¤ect, which arises solely from communicating and disseminating information to and from friends and acquaintances. The second is an imitation e¤ect, broadly understood as comprising of social norm e¤ects, complementarities, fads, etc. We …nd that both e¤ects are positive, sizeable and signi…cant. The more (and better) informed about the stock market members of respondents'social circles are, the higher the share of respondents'…nancial wealth that is invested in the stock market (information), in accordance with theoretical predictions. The same e¤ect is found for more members of respondents' circles participating in the stock market (imitation). In the latter case however, we only …nd evidence of selective imitation, by identifying a positive and signi…cant e¤ect coming only from a subset of respondents' social circle with whom respondents interact regarding …nancial matters. These …ndings suggest that both directly and indirectly informative social interactions are important for …nancial behavior and stock market participation.
Introduction
In recent times, …nancially developed economies experienced dramatic events such as the fast spread of stock market participation in the 1990s leading up to the burst of the dot-com bubble, and the spread of excessive borrowing against home equity leading to the recent global …nancial crisis. In the face of such large scale and systemically important events, it is natural to ask, what is the role of social interactions and peer e¤ects for the spread of …nancial behavior in the general population? In this paper, we focus on how social interactions and peer e¤ects a¤ect individuals'
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informed about the stock market is associated with both higher expected returns about the stock market, and a higher share of respondents'…nancial wealth invested in stocks. However, the same is true for perceived participation in the stock market by respondents'social circles, indicating the presence of imitation as well.
There are various reasons why we have this …nding: First, it could simply be that both e¤ects (information and imitation) are present and strong. Second, it may be due to the fact that there is a high correlation between participation in the stock market and being informed the stock market.
Third, these results (for both information and participation), may be due to unobserved correlated peer e¤ects. To reinforce our evidence of an information channel and address this last issue, we put to use an interesting interpretation of the theoretical model in the design of the survey.
Speci…cally, our theoretical framework suggests that aside from the usual social circle of friends and acquaintances of an individual, we can also identify a subset of it which we call the …nancial circle, i.e. people that the individual interacts with regarding …nancial matters, e.g. investments.
Implicit in this distinction is the fact that members of the …nancial circle have been speci…cally selected to discuss …nancial matters, because they are more knowledgeable and the respondent trusts their views (in the context of the theoretical model, members of the …nancial circle are considered to have more precise, informative signals). By asking respondents to directly report numbers and information about their …nancial circle, we can generate variables that correspond to both their …nancial circle and their outer circle (i.e. all those people with whom they do not discuss …nancial matters).
With this novelty in place, we can address three issues in one go. First, and foremost, we can reinforce our main conclusion that there is a strong and signi…cant pure information e¤ect present:
we …nd that when we regress the share of …nancial wealth invested in the stock market on two distinct variables, namely the proportions of one's …nancial and outer circles that are perceived to follow the stock market, the e¤ect of the former is sizeable and signi…cant, while the e¤ect from the latter is statistically insigni…cant. The interpretation of this is that information about the stock market simply does not pass from the outer circle to the respondents, because the respondents do not discuss …nancial matters with them, even though the outer circle may well be informed.
Second, it allows us to separate imitation into two types, and identify which one of the two is important for how much investors invest in the stock market. The …rst type is mindless imitation,
i.e. a pure imitation e¤ect, whereby respondents do what others in their circle do, due to e.g. peer pressure, or a fad e¤ect. The second type is selective imitation, i.e. the imitation of behavior of others in one's circle that are considered knowledgeable and trustworthy about …nancial matters. In the case of selective imitation, investors are in some sense taking the actions of the knowledgeable members of their circles as informative signals, and although this cannot be thought of a pure information transmission e¤ect, it does allow us to consider such social interactions as indirectly informative. We now …nd that when regressing the share of …nancial wealth invested in the stock market on two distinct variables proxying imitation, namely the proportions of one's …nancial and outer circles that are perceived to participate (invest) in the stock market, the e¤ect of the former is again sizeable and signi…cant, while the e¤ect from the latter is statistically insigni…cant.
This suggests that selective imitation is present, but we …nd no evidence in support of blind copying by respondents of the behavior of the members of their social circles regarding stock market participation.
Last, our approach of splitting the social circle of respondents into …nancial and outer circle helps us tackle the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. If indeed respondents and their social circles all follow and/or invest in the stock market (or not) because people tend in general to socialize with those that are similar to them, then we would expect to see positive and signi…cant e¤ects of the knowledge and participation of both the …nancial and outer circles on the share of …nancial wealth invested in the stock market by respondents. The fact that the e¤ects from the outer circles are insigni…cant, indicates that it is not the similarities in people's circles that matter for their stock market decisions, but rather their informative social interactions with members of their …nancial circle.
Our work is related to a budding literature examining peer e¤ects on asset and debt behavior of households (see Hong, et al., 2004 , and Georgarakos, Haliassos and Pasini, 2014 respectively) and a more voluminous one examining the e¤ect of subjective expectations on individual economic and …nancial behavior (summarized by Hurd, 2009 , and more recently, by Greenwood and Schleifer, 2014),; but also closely related to the literature on the e¤ects of social imitation and in ‡uence on …nancial behavior in competitive markets, within the larger literature on social and information networks (e.g. Jackson, 2008) .
Most related to our work is Bursztyn et al. (2014) , who conduct a …eld experiment in collaboration with a Brazilian brokerage …rm in order to disentangle endorsement from information from peers e¤ects on the willingness to invest in a new …nancial product. Similar to our …ndings, they conclude that both motives are important in individual …nancial decision making and that the social learning channel is relatively more important than the social utility channel, amongst more sophisticated investors. Also related is the work by Barnerjee et al. (2013) who conclude that most of peer e¤ects on the take-up rates of a newly introduced micro-…nance program in rural India is due to an information channel. Empirical work by Ozsoylev et al. (2014) exploits instead stock market transactions data to identify an empirical investor network from the time proximity between individual transactions. The main di¤erence with these papers is our focus on the general population, which allows us to understand the …nancial decisions of an average individual of a representative sample, but also the decision making of individuals with a variety of demographic characteristics. In contrast, these papers look into the decision making and information ‡ows in speci…c subgroups, like those who own a brokerage account (Bursztyn et al., 2014) where the exact network of relations and information ‡ows can be constructed or inferred, they unavoidably come with biases not present in a representative sample of the population containing a signi…cant proportion that is inactive in …nancial markets of a rich, developed country such as
France. The similarities and di¤erences with these papers are further discussed in Section 4.3.
The Model
Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) provide a microfoundation for an information network e¤ect within a rational model of equilibrium asset pricing where prices and private signals about asset returns transmit information. We extend their model to guide our survey design and empirical strategy. In what follows, we present a brief overview of the model and the generalization of their theorem and explain how the derived asset demand function will be used as a guide for identifying information peer e¤ects.
There are two assets, one risky (stock) and one riskless (bond). The payo¤ of the riskless asset is 1. The payo¤ of the risky asset follows a normal distribution X N ( X; 2 ) and its price is p.
The supply of stocks is random and is given by Z n = nZ, where Z N ( Z; 2 ) and Z > 0. 1 The …nal wealth of the agent is
where ! 0i is the initial wealth of agent i. Agent i chooses D i units of the risky asset to maximize expected utility from …nal wealth, conditional on his information set
where i is the absolute risk aversion of agent i, an agent thus solves the problem
and thus
Every agent i receives a primary (agent speci…c) piece of information in the form of a signal on the risky asset payo¤ y i = X + i , i N (0; s 2 i ). We allow heterogeneity across the variance of the signals of the agents, to re ‡ect the fact that agents may have more or less precise information about the risky asset for exogenous reasons.
Investors may know each other socially and these links are captured by an adjacency matrix A, where the typical element a ij can take value 1 or 0, if agents i and j know each other or not, respectively. We allow for loops, i.e. we let a ii = 1, for all agents. Since a ij = a ji , the matrix A is symmetric. For an investor i, his social circle is then de…ned by his network neighborhood, i.e. all investors j, such that a ij = 1.
To describe the …nancial circle of an investor, we de…ne an additional adjacency matrix G which describes the …nancial network. Investors determine their demand for the risky asset by pooling their own private information about its return, with private signals of investors with whom they interact socially. An investor combines his own signal with the those of his neighbors to generate his payo¤ signal x i , by averaging the signals of his social circle, weighted by their corresponding precisions. In particular, the weight on the signal of investor j used by investor i, is assumed to be the precision of the signal of agent j. 2 From the perspective of agent i, when he pools all the signals from his neighbors, he then puts more weight on agents with precise signals and less weight on those with less precision. The typical element of matrix G is then g ij = finformation is passed on from agent j to agent ig = a ij s 2 j ; in other words, G = A 1 , where = diag s 2 1 ; :::; s 2 n . We note that G represents a weighted and directed network. Let
be the connectedness of investor i. 3 The pooled payo¤ signal x i for agent i is:
The assumption that the network is weighted by signal precision captures the fact that investors put more importance on good quality information they receive from the social circle.
Next, let r ij = g ij = P n k=1 g ik be the intensity of the link between nodes i and j, which de…nes the intensity matrix R = [r ij ] . Then, we can de…ne
Finally, given the information network, investors'information sets are de…ned by I i = fx i ; pg; 8i = 1; :::; n
because also asset prices are allowed to transmit information in equilibrium, and investors rationally anticipate it. We note that the random variables X; Z and i are all jointly independent.
Under a set of assumptions on the asymptotic nature of the network structure as the number of investors n grows, we extend Theorem 1 of Ozsoylev and Walden (2011). 4 Broadly speaking, the assumptions require that the information network is sparse, i.e. that the strength of connections between agents are of the same order as the number of nodes, and that no agent is informationally superior in the large …nancial market (as n ! 1). The average connectedness of the large information network is de…ned via the assumption that
which imposes that the average node strength, weighted by risk aversions, is …nite. Then, it can be shown that there exists a linear noisy rational expectations equilibrium as n ! 1, such that with probability one the risky asset price converges to precision of i's signal. This is a more attractive assumption, but complicates unecessarily the mathematical expressions for the assumptions needed in deriving the optimal demand function, without altering the actual expression that we end up using for the econometric speci…cation.
where
and^ denotes the …nite harmonic mean of risk aversions of all agents in the population.
In determining the optimal demand for the risky assets, agents form a subjective expectation of the return on the asset, based on the average signal of their social circle. In equilibrium, and as n ! 1, the expected return for an investor i is given by
where k i = lim n!1 k i . This suggests that larger connectedness k i implies that investors expectations react more strongly to their pooled signal. Moreover, in equilibrium, the asymptotic demand for the risky asset by an agent i is:
This expression suggests that following: for a given average risk-adjusted connectedness , individual connectedness a¤ects demand via two channels: directly via the elasticity k i = i with respect to the conditional excess return (x i p), and indirectly through its e¤ect on excess return (in particular x i ).
The model therefore predicts that higher connectedness makes investors trade more aggressively.
In other words, conditional on investing in the stock market, higher connectedness implies higher demand for risky assets. In addition, higher k i may be the result of two e¤ects: (i) larger number of acquaintances (i.e. larger number of agents for which of a ij 6 = 0) and/or (ii) higher signal precision of the signals that individual i pools from his social interactions. We are interested in both predictions, but mostly on the second interpretation: that the more informative one's social interactions are (i.e. as the precision of an individual's pooled signals improves), the more his/her demand is for the risky asset responds to his/her pooled signals, and thus the conditional excess return. This is the information e¤ ect from informative social interactions that we seek to empirically identify exploiting our survey data.
To guide our empirical strategy, we note that both the expressions for expected returns (8) and optimal individual demand (9) require us to only know the average connectedness and the individual connectedness of investors, k i , and not the exact structure of the network. Therefore in designing the survey and generating proxies for these variables, a representative sample from a large population, for which we can identify measures for k i is su¢ cient for the research questions we address.
Survey Design
In this section, we provide a brief description of the survey design and the speci…cally designed The second set of questions asks respondents to state their perceptions about a future event (e.g. the expected return on a buy-and-hold portfolio that tracks the evolution of the stock market index, CAC-40, over a …ve-year time window), in order to understand if it determines their current …nancial behavior. The recent literature on measuring expectations privileges the use of probability questions rather than eliciting point expectations or the traditional qualitative approach of attitudinal research (Manski, 2004) . Answers to such questions are then used to understand if expectations and outcomes are related, and to evaluate if individual behavior changes in response to changes in expectations. 5 Crucially, we also include questions that inquire respondents about their perceptions regarding the most recent realization of the same measure (e.g. the most recent realized return on a buy-and-hold portfolio that tracks the evolution of the stock market index over a three-year time window). These questions are designed with the following four goals in mind. in mind households invest in the stock market. Second, probability densities are elicited on seven points of the outcome space, instead of just two points of the cumulative distribution functions, to obtain more precise individual estimates of the relevant moments. 6 Third, we exploit data from a representative sample by age, to better account for the hump-shaped age-portfolio pro…les at both margins recently identi…ed in the literature (Fagereng, et al., 2015) . Fourth, probabilistic elicitation of the most recent stock market return realization (over a three-year time window) provides a quantitative measure of households'degree of awareness regarding their investment opportunity set, to capture di¤erences in information across households as well as the relationship between information and expectations. 7 Without it, households who do not invest because they expect the stock market to drop over the given forecasting horizon are indistinguishable from those who do not invest because they are unaware of the investment opportunities available in the stock market.
We use responses to questions C39 and C42 (from TNS2014) to generate variables Expec: R and P erc: R respectively, which in turn are used as proxies for expected returns E (XjI i ) and perceived returns (based on signals) x i .
Third, the questionnaire contains a set of questions that are designed to identify the social circle of respondents and will be used for the empirical analysis. The aim is generate meaningful proxies for the individual connectedness k i of each respondents. A main novelty of the survey is to distinguish between a broad circle of social acquaintances of respondents (social circle) and a smaller circle, which is a subset of the social circle, de…ned as the respondents' acquaintances with whom the respondents convene about …nancial matters (…nancial circle) from responses to the following survey questions respectively (translated wording):
C1: Approximately how many people are there in your social circle of acquaintances? D1: With how many people from your social circle (as identi…ed in C1), do you interact with regarding your …nancial/investment matters?
Of the 2,587 respondents that returned the TNS2015 questionnaires, about 90% and 87%
answered questions C1 and D1 respectively. The average number of people in the respondents social circles and …nancial circles is 52.5 and 3.1 people respectively. About half of the valid responses for question D1 were zero, so we therefore also report that the average of the remaining half (i.e. not taking into account the zeros) is approximately 5 people. Question C1 is formulated with the network of social acquaintances in mind, as described by adjacency matrix A in Section 2.
For respondent i, the answer to C1 provides an approximation of the respondent's degree, de…ned by P n j=1 a ij . Question D1 de…nes a subset of the people from the respondent's social circle, and is formulated in order to generate broadly a proxy for the elements of matrix G, i.e. a statistic of whether information about the stock market is passed on from acquaintance j to respondent i. It is implicit in the formulation of D1 that respondents discuss …nancial matters with members of this inner circle, but do not do so with the remaining members of the social circle. In other words, we work with the presumption that respondents may be able to extract information (signals) about the stock market from the members of the …nancial circle, i.e. that (with normalized precision) if an acquaintance belongs in the respondent's …nancial circle, then g ij = a ij . On the other hand, other acquaintances are excluded from the …nancial circle, if their signal precision is 0 (i.e. when respondents state that they do not interact with them regarding …nancial matters), and in that case g ij = 0. This allows us to naturally de…ne a third circle for each respondent, which is the social circle excluding the …nancial circle, namely the outer circle. Responses regarding the outer circle of respondents are used for reinforcing the argument in favor of an information channel in making …nancial decisions that comes from informative social interactions. Of the 2,587 respondents that send back the TNS2015 questionnaires, about 96% and 88% of respondents provided valid answers for questions C7 and D16 respectively. 9 The cross-sectional average point estimates for the perceived percentage of the social and …nancial circle that invests 8 The re ‡ection problem refers to the impossibility of separately identifying the e¤ect of peers'choices (endogenous factors) on individual outcomes, when individual and peers' choices are made simultaneously and as a function of common contextual factors (i.e. group characteristics). If instead of considering peers' actual choices, one exploits the variation in individual perceptions about peers'choices, when combined with individual perceptions about peers' characteristics, identi…cation can be achieved. Li and Lee (2009) actually …nd that subjective perceptions about peers' behaviour in a social interactions model of voting, predicts better individual outcomes than a model where instead (rational expectations) equilibrium beliefs are assumed. See Blume et al. (2011) for additional details. 9 In answering each of the questions, the respondent was also given the option to tick the box 'I do not know '. About 64% and 61% chose this option for questions C7i and D16i respectively. About 61% and 58% reported this option for questions C7ii and D16ii, respectively.
Abbreviation
Stands for Questions From in the stock market is 10.6% and 20.1% respectively. Also, the cross-sectional average point estimates for the perceived percentages of the social and the …nancial circles that follows the stock market are 12.4% and 21.9% respectively. These questions de…ne directly variables %SC P articip:, %F C P articip, %SC Inf orm: and %F C Inf orm: The perceived percentage of the outer circle of a respondent that invests in or is informed about the stock market is calculated via
SC
For notational convenience we use the abbreviations SC, FC, OC for the social circle (de…ned by C1), …nancial circle (de…ned by D1) and outer circle (de…ned as answer to C1 -answer to D1) respectively. We also use various other abbreviations for presentation purposes that are all summarized in Table 1 . De…nitions, exact question statements and detailed explanations on the variables and the survey questions can be found later in the paper and in Appendix B.
Empirical results
In the empirical analysis that follows, we proxy the connectedness of respondents k i with variables %SC Inf orm:, %F C Inf orm:, %OC Inf orm:, as de…ned in the previous section. We focus on these variables, because simply the number of friends and acquaintances of an individual (in any of the three circles) is not enough to distinguish between those friends who are informed from those who are uninformed about the stock market. Questions C7ii/D16ii, from which we get these three variables, isolate explicitly the part of one's social and …nancial circles that may provide respondents with information regarding the stock market.
Although the model makes predictions only in the context of an information network, our data allows us to also explore how the participation of peers in the stock market a¤ects one's demand for stocks. Broadly, questions C7i/D16i will be used to address whether 'what others do'matters for an individual's decision to invest in the stock market. This follows regression analysis of canonical peer-e¤ects models of social and economic interactions, where the demand of an agent for investing in the stock market is related to a weighted average of his perceived demands of his friends and acquaintances that also participate in the stock market.
The split of the whole social circle between …nancial and outer circle serves two purposes:
First, as will become clear when we present the empirical results, it provides evidence against the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in our regressions. More interestingly, it helps us disentangle the imitation e¤ect into mindless and selective, when we ask, is it 'what others do'or 'what others that know do'that matters for investing in the stock market?
Expectations.
We start by examining the presence of the …rst (indirect) e¤ect of informative social interactions on demand for investing in the stock market, via expected returns. 10 A linearization of expression 1 0 Standard models of …nancial choice under uncertainty predict that decisions should be based on expectations of aggregate market outcomes, and not on publicly available information about recent market outcomes since the 
where w i is an individual zero-mean error term distributed normally conditional on covariates and i is a vector individual characteristics. The controls included in vector i for all speci…cations are age, gender, marital status, number of children, education, geographical region, employment status, assets, income, borrowing, liquid savings. In all the speci…cations we also include nonresponse dummies in order to control for item non-responses. 11 A detailed list and explanations are provided in Appendix B. 1 1 Controlling for item non-response to the expectations and perceptions questions is important because we are identifying an information e¤ect (from acquaintances with whom the respondent exchanges on …nancial matters). The fact that controlling for item non response to those questions leaves the size and statistical signi…cance of the main e¤ect unchanged (of others' information on own …nancial decision) provides additional evidence of the robustness of the identi…ed channel, i.e. those who are unable/unwilling to respond are are as likely not to invest as they are likely not to exchange on …nancial matters with friends and acquaintances. The same approached has been used by Dimmock, et. al. (2016) .
during the second half of 2011. After that and as we get closer to the time that the survey and its follow-up questionnaire were …elded, the stock market index has been steadily recovering. Both in December 2014 and May 2015, the index was still below its dot-com and Lehman brothers peaks, but had already recovered relative to the sovereign-debt crisis one. Given the substantial turmoil experienced by the stock market index over the recent period, it is likely that respondents are particularly aware of the recent stock market evolution, but provide very heterogeneous and uncertain answers regarding its future evolution.
The actual stock market returns over the three-year period in question were actually equal to +34:3%: The average cross-sectional perception of respondents is equal to +3:6%, therefore, upwards deviations from the cross-sectional mean and positive associations with perceived returns are interpreted as consistent with respondents being well informed about the stock market. Moreover, the average cross-sectional subjective expectation of respondents is equal to +1:6%, which is substantially lower than the expected returns that could be computed by December 2014 from simple extrapolation of publicly available time series data. Again, upwards deviations from the cross-sectional mean and positive associations with subjective expected returns are interpreted as consistent with respondents'expectations being more in line with available statistical evidence. Tables 2 and 3 reports results from regressing expected returns on the di¤erent measures of connectedness and participation of peers, without and with perceived returns respectively as additional controls. The speci…cation for columns (2) and (3) includes only the information variables, k i , and columns (4) and (5) only the imitation variables D e i . Columns (2) and (4) from both tables suggest that whether the members of the respondents'social circles are informed about or invest in the stock market does matter for forming their subjective expectations on stock market returns. Once however the broad social circle is split into the two subgroups of …nancial and outer circle, we see evidence of the pure information and selective imitation channels on the formation of expectations. In columns (3) and (5) of both tables, the share of …nancial circle informed and the share of …nancial circle investing in the stock market is small, but nevertheless positive and signi…cant. This con…rms the model prediction that is, in a world of pessimistic perceptions of stock market returns, having informative social interactions (…nancial circle) corrects respondents' expectations of returns upwards towards the true return, whether via a pure information channel or via selective imitation. Table 3 suggests that a large e¤ect on subjective return expectations comes from perceived returns, but even when controlling for perceived returns, the main result survives.
In summary, to the extend that expectations of returns are important for how much investors invest in the stock market, we …nd that informative social interactions play a positive (albeit small) role in determining expected returns of respondents.
Pure information and selective imitation.
Next, we turn to examining the importance of informative social interactions for directly determining demand for investing in the stock market, as suggested by expression (9) . Reorganizing this indicates that the risk adjusted individual demands depend on a term that is common to all (13) and (14) . Tobit conditional marginal e¤ects of covariates on the share of all …nancial wealth invested in the stock market.
agents, and a term that is individual-speci…c. Since we are exploiting the variation across agents, a linearization of (9) suggests the following Tobit econometric speci…cation for agent i's share of …nancial wealth invested in the stock market:
where u i is an individual-speci…c unbiased error term that the individual observes, but the econometrician does not. The zero term within it captures the observed prevalence of non stockholders in the general population. The vector i contains individual characteristics for respondent i. 12 The signs under the constant coe¢ cients indicate the theoretically predicted signs: more/stronger connections ( 1 ), a higher excess return ( 2 ) and lower risk aversion ( In regression analysis of canonical peer-e¤ects models of social and economic interactions, the demand of an agent for investing in the stock market is related to a weighted average of his perceived demands of his friends and acquaintances that also participate in the stock market. Therefore and in order to examine the role of selective imitation, we also consider the following speci…cation
An imitation e¤ect, broadly understood, is present if the parameter 4 is strictly positive and statistically signi…cant, when D e i is taken to be the respondent's social circle. We call the e¤ect 'selective imitation', if when splitting the social circle into …nancial and outer, the coe¢ cient is signi…cant for members of the …nancial circle. Our main results are presented in tables 4 and 5. Table 4 reports results from estimating a probit econometric speci…cations of the extensive margin only, that are otherwise similar to speci…cations (13) and (14) . Columns (2) and (3) provide evidence of a very signi…cant information e¤ect: the probability of investing in the stock market is associated with higher share of informed members of the social circle, and when the social circle is split between …nancial and outer circle, it is the share of the …nancial circle that follows the stock market that matters for the investment decision. The coe¢ cient for %OC inf orm: is insigni…cant because although some members of one's outer circle may follow the stock market, by de…nition of the survey questions, the respondent does not discuss with these members any …nancial matters, thus any information they hold is irrelevant for the stock market participation decision of the respondent. Columns (4) and (5) provide similar evidence for the importance of peers' participation in the stock market for the probability of investing in the stock market.
Looking at the social circle alone, a strong signi…cant e¤ect is present (double in size from the information e¤ect in column (4)), indicating possible imitation. When the social circle is split into …nancial and outer circles however, the participation of the members of the …nancial circle is more important than that of the members of outer circle (the coe¢ cient for the latter is smaller and less signi…cant), supporting the view that respondents selectively imitate their peers 'that know '. We also note that there is a substantial e¤ect on the probability of investing in the stock market from the expectations of future returns, but this becomes smaller when we include %F C inf orm and %OC inf orm, or %F C particip and %OC particip in the regressors.
Last, we turn to the estimates from the Tobit speci…cation that quantify the e¤ects we wish to isolate. The results from Table 5 con…rm the …ndings from Table 4 and provide evidence of a sizeable direct information e¤ect. Once again, when the circle of acquaintances is split between …nancial and outer circles, the information e¤ect is only signi…cant for the …nancial circle. When the average proportion of an individual's …nancial circle that is perceived to follow the stock market increases by one percentage point, the share of wealth that the individual invests in the stock market increases by 0.142 pp among stockholders, and by 0:0310 pp overall. 13 To get a sense of what the actual size of this information e¤ect is on the share of …nancial wealth invested in the stock market of a typical stockholder, we do the following simple numerical experiment: A typical stockholder in our sample has total …nancial wealth (excluding housing) that is e96,395. 14 We …nd that respondents that are stockholders invest on average about 21.4% of their …nancial wealth in the stock market, i.e. the typical stockholder invests about e20,628 in the stock market. We next impute how much more the average stockholder invests when his …nancial circle has an additional member that is informed about the stock market. The average number of people in the …nancial circle of stock holders is 3, and on average, respondents that are stock holders report that 28% of their …nancial circle is informed about the stock market. This translates approximately to one in three people from the …nancial circle is informed, so that the marginal e¤ect of having one additional informed person in the …nancial circle (i.e. two out three people, or 66% of the …nancial circle) from Table 5 Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 support the existence of a selective imitation e¤ect, as seen with the previous speci…cations. When the average proportion of an individual's …nancial circle that is perceived to invest in the stock market increases by one percentage point, the share of wealth 1 3 The uncoditional average marginal e¤ect is obtained from estimating a separate probit speci…cation for the probability of being a stockholder (directly or indirectly) conditional on the same covariates, and employing the standard decomposition: unconditional individual probability of participation in a novel micro…nance programme by the (structurally estimated) individual probability of participation, conditional on individual information sourced from friends. Once informed, they …nd that an agent's decision to participate in the programme is not signi…cantly in ‡uenced by the fraction of her friends participating, concluding that it is mainly an information e¤ect. 16 This may seem to be in contrast to our …ndings, but it is not. This is because in their setting social links function simply as vehicles for transmitting otherwise inaccessible information, that makes agents aware about a …nancial product. In our framework, agents are already aware of the …nancial opportunities but potentially pool di¤er-ent pieces of private information signals from a variety of acquaintances, in order to re…ne their perceptions of potential returns on their stock market investments.
Bursztyn et al. (2014) instead …nd empirical support for both information and imitation channels. They design a …eld experiment amongst socially paired investors of a Brazilian brokerage
…rm, and through sequential randomization, they separate the e¤ect of a social peer actually purchasing a new …nancial product from being informed about it through the social peer who was intending to buy but was nevertheless unable to (also randomly). To disentangle the two e¤ects, they put investors in pairs according to whether a social tie exists between them, and randomly assign the opportunity to purchase the new …nancial product to one of them. The authors then sequentially allocate randomly (1) the actual purchase of the asset amongst those who were o¤ered the opportunity and expressed an interest in buying it, and (2) the information that the socially related investor had actually managed to purchase the asset. The authors are then able to separately identify a social utility component from a social learning component in …nancial decision making by (i) comparing the e¤ect on the propensity to invest of the socially paired investor who was not initially given the opportunity to invest, of providing him information (1) relative to no information (identi…es social learning), and (ii) examining the di¤erential e¤ect on the propensity to invest of the socially paired investor of information (2) versus information (1) (the di¤erence identi…es the social utility component). The overall peer e¤ect on the propensity to invest obtains from the di¤erential impact of information (2) relative to no information. 1 5 The uncoditional average marginal e¤ect is obtained from estimating the probit speci…cation for the probability of being a stockholder (directly or indirectly) conditional on the same covariates, and employing the standard decomposition: Here, we carry out a di¤erent analysis in an attempt to address similar questions. The main di¤erence between these two papers and our approach is that while both papers work with a newly introduced …nancial product, we consider the decision to invest in the stock market, a preexisting, old …nancial opportunity which is publicly available to all. This is done in the context of rich developed country (France) with a healthy and well functioning stock market. Relative Our empirical results throughout the paper suggest that the more informed an agent's …nancial circle is about the stock market, the more he/she tends to invest in the stock market, and similarly for perceived participation of peers. We interpret this …nding to be in accordance with the predictions of the model, i.e. conditional on investing, an agent collects more information from better informed peers, and thus trades more aggressively. However, the estimates from columns (2) and (4) from all tables are also consistent with an unobserved heterogeneity explanation, which in our context we can think of as homophily: Agents tend to socialize or discuss …nancial matters with others that are similar to them and therefore they tend to have similar attitudes towards investing in the stock market. We use a battery of approaches to tackle this problem. First, the split between …nancial and outer circle, and the fact there are no signi…cant estimated e¤ects from the outer circle that a¤ect the demand for stock market investment suggests that it is not similarities among members of the social circles that drive the results. Second, we use four questions (C5, D6, D7 and D8) from the TNS2015 questionnaire that asks respondents to report how they perceive themselves relative to those in their social and …nancial circles, in terms of professional standing, value of their …nancial assets and quali…cations. For all these questions, respondents answered that less than half of their acquaintances were similar to them in terms of quali…cations and professional standing, or had more or less the same assets as them. This does not indicate strong homophily, thus lending more support to our model backed interpretation of the estimated e¤ects. Third, we run placebo tests on the …nancial circles of respondents [TBC] . All these suggest that our results are not biased and that they indeed capture the fact that informative social interactions, whether directly or indirectly, are associated with more investment in the stock market by individuals.
Summary
We provide a theoretical foundation for a pure information peer e¤ect of social interactions on individual demands for risky assets and …nd strong empirical support for it by exploiting purposemade (by us) novel survey data for a representative sample of the French population by age, wealth and asset classes, collected in December 2014 and May 2015. When estimating a canonical peer e¤ects regression model to disentangle imitation from information peer e¤ects on stock holdings and the share of …nancial wealth invested in the stock market, we …nd that both are present and are quantitatively important, in line with the results obtained by Bursztyn et al. (2014) , and therefore extending them to the general population. When inquiring into the actual mechanism by which respondents' source information from peers, we found that respondents' subjective expectations of stock market returns are determined by both imitation and information e¤ects from peers. By separating the social circle of respondents into two complementary circles, the …nancial circle (i.e.
people that respondents discuss their …nancial matters) and the outer circle (everyone else), we are able to conclude that our results are not consistent with mindless imitation of stock market participation. If there is in any imitation of others' …nancial behavior, it is selective and comes from social interactions that are informative.
APPENDICES INCOMPLETE -TBC

A. Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium
We conjecture that the risky asset price has the form
and imposing market clearing .
Next, we make some notational assumptions. Let S Cov (R ) = R R T so that R = K 1 G =
where K is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements the sums of the rows of G, i.e.
the strengths of the nodes, K = diag [k 1 ; :::; k n ] ; and therefore
where the matrix W is de…ned by W = G G T = A 1 A. We note that because A is symmetric and a ij 2 f0; 1g , it is trivially true that W ii = k i = P n j=1 a ij =s 2 j . Finally we make the following assumptions: A3. The risk aversion coe¢ cients come from a distribution such that the harmonic mean is …nite as n ! 1, i.e.
exists and is …nite. The interpretation of this assumption is that no investor can be a node with very large strength as the network becomes larger. In other words, no agent can have too many connections that have very precise signals. This excludes scenarios of an informationally superior elite in the network.
Under these assumptions can extend Ozsoylev and Walden's results to the following: Theorem 1. Under Assumptions A1-A4, with probability 1, the equilibrium asset price converges to
= and the optimal demand for the risky asset for an investor i is
The proof follows the same steps as in Ozsoylev and Walden with some suitable modi…cations.
The strategy of the proof is to follow the 'guess-and-verify'approach, and the main steps are:
1. Conjecture a functional (linear) form for the price, with unknown coe¢ cients.
Derive beliefs for the agents as a function of the price coe¢ cients (using Bayesian updating).
3. Derive the optimal demands for the agents given their endogenous beliefs.
4. Impose market clearing and solve for the stock price.
5. Impose rational expectations (i.e. equalize coe¢ cients) and con…rm that the corresponding system of equation generates a solution, which will then provide solutions for the price coe¢ cients.
6. Check, with asymptotic arguments that conditions required to ensure that the coe¢ cients exist (i.e. the system has solution) as n ! 1, are satis…ed given the assumptions A1-A4.
The detailed steps of the proof are available upon request.
B. Definitions of Variables
B.1. Expec R and Perc R: Subjective Expectations and Perceptions of Stock Market
Returns. To measure expectations, we elicited probabilistically respondents' beliefs about the cumulative stock market (CAC-40 index) return over a …ve-year horizon, P t+5 ; relative to December 2014, P t ; from the following questions (translated wording):
C39: 'In …ve years from now, do you think that the stock market... ' (For each category write down how likely the occurrence is by assigning a value between 0 and 100. The sum of all your answers must be equal to 100):
... will have increased by more than 25%
... will have increased by 10 to 25%
... will have increased by less than 10%
... will be the same ... will have decreased by less than 10%
... will have decreased by 10 to 25%
... will have decreased by more than 25% Question C39 inquires respondent i about the subjective relative likelihood of occurrence, p i t+1;k , of each of the seven alternative scenarios, k = 1; :::; 7. Each scenario represents a possible outcome range for the index percentage change between t and t + 5, R t+1 (5) and respondents'subjective likelihoods are accordingly:
and zero elsewhere, i.e. R t+1 2 ( 1; R i min ) [ (R i max ; +1): Table 6 reports summary sample statistics for respondents' answers regarding expectations about stock market returns, imposing a uniform distribution within the di¤erent outcome ranges. On average, households appear more pessimistic and uncertain than the historical record would predict.
To quantitatively assess how informed respondents are, we elicit probabilistically respondents' perceptions about the most recent cumulative stock market return (CAC-40 index) over the three years, P t 3 ; immediately prior to …elding the survey (December 2014), P t ; as follows (translated wording):
Similarly, we let 1 + Rt(s) denote the stock market index gross return over the most recent s periods from date t s to date t (hence the subindex t): ... has increased by more than 25%
... has increased by 10 to 25%
... has increased by less than 10%
... has remained the same ... has decreased by less than 10%
... has decreased by 10 to 25%
... has decreased by more than 25% Question C42 inquires household i about the subjective relative likelihood of occurrence, p i t;k , of each of the seven alternative scenarios, k = 1; :::; 7. Each scenario represents a possible outcome range for the percentage change in the index between t 3 and t, R t (3)
1. Probabilistic elicitation of realized outcomes thus enables us to measure how uncertain they are in conveying their answers. Since ranges k = 1 and k = 7 are unbounded, we set (R max ; R min ) to match observed values. The outcome ranges for R t are identical to those of question C39 inquiring about beliefs instead, and which is described below. Accordingly, households' subjective likelihoods are given by:
Three years prior to the time when the survey was conducted (December 2011), the stock market index was only slightly above the ‡oors reached after the dot-com and Lehman Brothers busts.
But, between December 2011 (CAC 40 = 3222:2) and December 2014 (CAC 40 = 4295:85), the index had increased an overall 34.3%. Figure 1 shows the information time window chosen within the wanderings of the CAC-40 index between 1990 and 2015. Table 6 reports summary sample statistics for respondents'answers regarding perceptions and beliefs about stock market returns, imposing a uniform distribution within the di¤erent outcome ranges.
A striking …nding is that households are on average also pessimistic regarding the most recent three-year cumulative stock market return (Dec. 2011-Dec. 2014). Although this might be due to imperfect recall given the unusually long horizon (although respondents were given enough time to access the internet or else, and report the correct response) it might also be related to do not increase the odds of being informed, and actually signi…cantly decreases them for those who follow family advice. Since those who follow friends'advice are more likely to be informed, they interpret the evidence as being consistent with social interactions being instrumental in gathering information (Hong et al., 2004) . On the other hand, a measure of optimism ('being lucky in life') has a negative impact on being informed, indicating that an 'overcon…dence bias' is not present once gender is conditioned upon: although males appear better informed, supporting more optimistic forward looking expectations, optimists appear consistently worse informed. On the bais of that …nding, they argue that Bilias et al.'s (2010) …ndings consistent with inertia in households' portfolios can be reconciled with Guiso and Jappelli's (2006) …dings consistent with excess trading even amongst the general population. Importantly, they do not …nd evidence of temporal or risk preferences determining information sets, in line with Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010). In addition, and although total wealth does not increase the odds of being informed, income does, in line with a costly information acquisition interpretation (Peress, 2004) . Finally, they report that optimists and low income/income constrained respondents are less likely to be informed, consistent with rational inattention theory (Sims, 2003) .
B.2. %FW:
Financial wealth invested in the stock market. Respondents report their total …nancial wealth and the share of their total …nancial wealth invested in the stock market, in questions C16 and C19 respectively (TNS2014). Question C16 ask respondents to report their total …nancial wealth (excluding housing) and their given brackets (see below for further details).
The translated wording for question C19 is:
C19: Approximately what percentage of these total …nancial wealth have you invested in listed or unlisted shares, directly or in unit trusts, in a personal equity plan or not (yourself or a member of your household)? If you don't have any, please answer 0%.
We have a total of 2,891 observations for these questions. Out of 3,780 survey respondents, about 76% responded meaningfully. The mean percentage of …nancial wealth invested in the stock market is 5.32%, and the standard deviation is 14.52%. available brackets corresponds to the household's non-human wealth, including housing, estates and professional assets (without excluding debt). 18 Total wealth is given in Euros.
Total …nancial wealth: In the survey (question C16), the respondent is asked which of the ten prede…ned available brackets corresponds to the household's …nancial wealth (excluding housing, estates and professional assets), including cash and positive balances on checking accounts. 19 Total …nancial wealth is given in Euros.
Income: For the income of the household, the survey (question A12) asks the respondent which of the nine prede…ned available brackets better corresponds to her situation. Income refers to the respondent's annual income (earnings, pensions, bonuses, etc.) in Euros, net of social contributions but before personal income taxes. 20 In addition, TNS reports also the net gross monthly income of the household, in Euros.
Occupational status: (of the household head) the TNS 2014 survey asks respondents about their occupation, grouped into …ve categories: 'inactive'; 'unemployed'; 'employed'which includes 'white-collar'(liberal and managerial employees) and 'blue-collar'workers (employees, clerical and manual workers); 'self-employed'which includes farmers, artisans and shop and business owners, and 'retired'. Finally, we group the …rst two categories into one, the reference category.
Preferences.
Absolute risk aversion (CARA):
The following question is asked to the respondent: 'If someone suggests that you make an investment, e S i , whereby you have one chance out of two win 5000 euros and one chance out of two of losing the capital invested, how much (as a maximum)
will you invest?' The question aims at eliciting the taste for risk from each respondent i;
with preferences u i (:), from the following equality:
The coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) can be then obtained from a second order Taylor expansion, as A i (w i ) = 2(5000 Z i )=(5000 2 + Z 2 i ), where Z i is the amount that the respondent declares to be willing to invest. Those who declare Z i < 5000 are risk- 
Demographics.
Age: it is a continuous variable equal to the age of the household head. Respondents'age range is in between 19 and 94.
Gender : it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a male, and is equal to 0, if a female. 
Information.
Education is a captured by a single categorical variable which takes value 1 if the respondent completed college or a diploma above (BAs, BScs, MScs, MBAs, professional certi…cations, PhDs and postdoctoral students), and takes value zero otherwise, i.e. High school or less (primary and secondary) and if the respondent failed to complete college education (technical degrees beyond high school but below college, including professional and vocational degrees).
Sources of Information variables:
* Respondents are inquired, for each alternative source of information (Friends, family, …nancial advisors, general media and specialised media), about the relative frequency of consultation (often, sometimes or never). For each information source, a dummy variable is created which takes value 1 if the answer is 'often', and 0 otherwise. * Respondents are inquired, for each alternative source of TV information (General information and economics emissions) , about the relative frequency of consultation (very often, often, occasionally, sometimes or never). For each information source, a dummy variable is created which takes value 1 if the answer is 'often'or 'very often', and 0 otherwise.
C. Full Tables
In all the tables, item non-response categorical variables are included, unless otherwise stated. The reference categories used are 'less than 35', 'highschool', 'reg 1', and …rst quartiles of total wealth, income and saving, wherever relevant. (13) and (14) . Tobit conditional marginal e¤ects of covariates on the share of all …nancial wealth invested in the stock market, full table.
